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In the past decade, Timothy O'Connor has established himself 
as one of the leading defenders of the agent-causal theory of free 
action. In Persons & Causes, O'Connor provides a sophisticated 
defense of incompatibilist freedom and his own agent-causal and 
volitional theory of the etiology of action. He includes an account 
of a non-causal theory of the role of reasons in the explanation of 
action and a defense of emergentism as a means of making sense 
of how agents can possess the requisite active powers for them to 
act freely. Additionally, O'Connor critiques the most prominent 
alternatives to the agency theory at providing a libertarian theory 
of free action, as well as other varieties of the agency theory. 
Altogether, he provides a solid assessment and critique of the major 
alternatives to the agency theory, coupled with what is perhaps the 
best recent defense of a traditional agent-causal theory of free 
action. 
O'Connor begins chapter one of his book by considering the 
implications of determinism for human freedom by evaluating some 
modal principles that have undergirded recent arguments for 
incompatibilism. The modal notions in question are encapsulated 
in what Peter van Inwagen dubbed the consequence argument The 
argument involves an analysis of the transfer of power necessity 
that results from past events and the laws of nature if determinism 
is true. The transfer of necessity that obtains is such that if at 
some time t2 agent S wills to V, and if S*s willing to V is causally 
necessitated by the laws of nature and some earlier event at t{ 
beyond S*s control at then S*s choice and subsequent action V 
were not up to S. Therefore, 5"s action was not free. 
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The remainder of the chapter is devoted to arguing for the 
cogency of the argument for incompatibilism, as well as a brief 
consideration of the kinds of responses offered by compatibilists 
to such arguments. Finally, he concludes by offering a brief analysis 
of the problem of moral responsibility (taken up again in chapter 
four). He considers Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the 
Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)—defending the "flicker 
of freedom" defense of some form of PAP and critiquing John 
Martin Fischer's semi-compatibilism (the view that free will and 
determinism are incompatible, but moral responsibility and 
determinism are compatible). 
Having argued for the incompatibility of freedom with 
determinism, O'Connor puts forth two basic conditions for 
responsible agency in chapter two. The first requirement is that 
one must provide a clear account of agent control. Libertarians 
have often been criticized for defending a theory of erratic agency; 
thus, their burden has traditionally been to provide an adequate 
account of rational agency and agent control, an onus compatibilists 
have traditionally not had to shoulder. Second, "an account of 
human free agency . . . must allow for there being alternative 
courses of action that are genuinely open to the agent" (p. 24). 
For the libertarian this has not been a problem; however, the 
compatibilist has faced difficulties trying to provide an adequate 
account of what it means for someone to have genuine alternatives. 
O'Connor first examines the efforts of simple indeterminists 
(specifically, Carl Ginet) and causal indeterminists (Storrs McCall, 
Robert Nozick, and Robert Kane) at providing a compelling theory 
of libertarian free agency. He concludes that both the simple 
indeterminist and causal indeterminist fail to provide satisfactory 
accounts of agent control. The simple indeterminist's analysis of 
agent control, "implicitly requires that the core mental events are 
entirely uncaused" (p. 27). O'Connor adds that, "if fundamental 
physical processes are causal ly connec ted (perhaps 
indeterministically), supposing there are free decisions in 
accordance with this analysis is inconsistent with a materialist and 
even an emergent dualist account of human mental activity" (p. 
27). On the other hand, probabilistic causal analyses of agent 
control, despite some distinctions between the theories, suffer from 
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similar problems over explaining agent control, according to 
O'Connor. "[T]he causal indeterminist needs to confront directly 
the challenge of explaining how it is that an agent can have a choice 
about which potential indeterministic cause will be efficacious in 
a given situation" (pp. 29-30). O'Connor argues none of the extant 
theories offered to date have effectively accomplished this task. 
In chapters three and four, O'Connor considers the agency 
theory as a means of providing a more effective defense of a 
libertarian theory of free action. In chapter three he focuses on 
the defenses of the agency theory proffered by Thomas Reid, 
Roderick Chisholm, and Richard Taylor. O'Connor's treatment 
of Chisholm, in particular, is outstanding and reflects a deep 
familiarity with Chisholm's work. Great care is taken in an 
appendix to chapter three trying to understand the development of 
Chisholm's thought from the agency theory into a disingenuous 
variety of simple indeterminism and, finally, to an outright rejection 
of the agency theory in favor of regarding agent-causation as a 
subspecies of event-causation. 
O'Connor notes that Richard Taylor is one of a few action 
theorists who has provided an account of the agency theory not as 
a means of defending a libertarian theory of free action, but to 
understand action simpliciter. Taylor suggested the concept of 
agency is compatible with determinism and does not require any 
particular commitments to an account of free action. 
O'Connor argues that Taylor's account suffers from two major 
problems. First, O'Connor contends that one's being the agent-
cause of all of one's actions "undercuts the utility of the agency 
theory as a solution to the metaphysical problem of human 
responsibility and freedom" (p. 51). Some of our actions are not 
free, and O'Connor maintains that those actions are not agent-
caused. But the problem with O'Connor's criticism is that he fails 
to see how much more consistent Taylor was in his days of 
defending the agency theory (he has since rejected agent-causation) 
than those like O'Connor who defend the agency theory while 
maintaining that at least some actions are not agent-caused and 
are determined by event-causes. O'Connor never provides a 
satisfactory account of what mechanism would be responsible for 
when an action is caused by an agent and when an action is not 
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agent-caused. In chapter six, under the heading of his discussion 
of emergent active powers, O'Connor even admits that, "[an] issue 
an emergentist version of the agency theory faces is a result of the 
fact that if there are agent-causal events, there is no neat and simple 
way of dividing them from event-causal ones" (p. 122). O'Connor 
fails to provide a satisfactory account of how event- and agent-
causal processes interact (see p. 123). Taylor at least takes all 
actions to be agent-caused. His theory is simpler and perhaps 
preferable on that level. But Taylor's theory suffers from 
deficiencies, evinced by O'Connor's second criticism. 
O'Connor's second criticism generates genuine problems for 
Taylor. For Taylor, agent-causation is conceptually primitive, but 
its ontological status is questionable. As a result confusion arises 
in his theory when explaining how agent-caused actions can be 
caused, and thus determined, by an event. More specifically, 
O'Connor asks, "Just how are we to understand the notion of an 
exercise of active power itself produced by some prior factor?" 
(p. 52). If the agent-causing of an action is ontologically primitive, 
then it would seem it would make no sense to describe an agent 
causing her action as following from an event that is sufficient for 
her to cause her action. As O'Connor notes, "If A's doing e always 
consists of A's causing e, then A's doing e does entail that A is not 
caused to do e" (p. 55). (One would want to add that "A's causing 
e" would have to be irreducible to an event-causal relation of the 
sort posited by the causal indeterminist. For the causal 
indeterminist may be willing to agree that agent-causation is 
conceptually primitive where the agent-causal relation is simply 
reducible to an event-causal relation.) 
In chapter four O'Connor develops his own views, contrasting 
them with the hybrid causal agent-causal theory of action (an agent-
causal theory of action that incorporates a causal indeterminist 
theory of acting for reasons) defended by Randolph Clarke. 
Additionally, he addresses the standard challenge to the coherence 
of the agency theory, specifically the intelligibility of causation 
by a substance, as offered by C D . Broad and built upon by others 
since. He also critiques Raziel Abelson's ersatz agent-causal ism 
and reexamines PAP and how the agency theory can be used to 
defuse Frankfurt-style cases. 
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O'Connor takes agent-causation to embody "the same primitive 
feature of causal production, or oomph, at work in event causation, 
the differences consisting in the way that certain properties 
contribute to the causal potentialities of objects that have 'active 
power'" (p. 67). More specifically, he defends a realist theory of 
event-causation where objects manifest causal powers that are 
observable in their effects. The relevant causal powers are based 
in an object's underlying nature. The powers are features of clusters 
of properties linked with functions to effects from circumstances 
(p. 71). O'Connor writes, following R. Harre and E.H. Madden, 
that, "Circumstances prompt the exercise of a power in one of two 
ways: either by stimulating a latent mechanism to action or by 
removing inhibitors to the activity of a mechanism in a state of 
readiness to act" (p. 71). O'Connor uses the example of turning a 
car's ignition key as an example of a mechanism-triggering event; 
and the displacement of air from an underwater cylinder, "which 
enables the body of water to crush the object," as an example of a 
barrier-removing event (p. 71). 
In the case of agent-causation, the agent causes a state of 
intention that gives rise to further actions. He proffers the following 
account. 
[P]arallel to event causes, the distinctive capacities of 
agent causes ('active powers') are grounded in a 
property or set of properties. So any agent having the 
relevant internal properties will have it directly within 
his power to cause any of a range of states of intention 
delimited by internal and external circumstances. 
However, these properties function differently in the 
associated causal process. Instead of being associated 
with 'functions from circumstances to effects,' they (in 
conjunction with appropriate circumstances) make 
possible the agent's producing an effect. These choice-
enabling properties ground a different type of causal 
power of capacity—one that in suitable circumstances 
is freely exercised by the agent himself, (p. 72) 
O'Connor anticipates objections to such an account, in 
particular his simultaneously holding to a causal powers theory of 
74 AUSLEGUNG 
event causation, which is an antisingularist variety of causal 
realism, while defending an account of agent-causation that implies 
singularism. Singularists hold that causation is not general, in the 
sense that the presence of certain event-types does not entail that 
they will always cause a certain type of event. Unfortunately, 
O'Connor seems to wave off any problems this discrepancy 
illumines in his account, suggesting that the problem is not with 
his account but with the current conception of the singularist/ 
antisingularist distinction (pp. 72-73). 
Is such an account of agent-causation satisfactory? That is, 
has O'Connor genuinely illuminated and rendered intelligible the 
nature of the causal relationship the agency theorist claims obtains 
between an agent and her acting? For O'Connor, the event that is 
a basic action is initiated by the agent qua cause. To suggest 
otherwise would be to say that the causing of the basic action by 
the agent is an event discrete from the basic action. If such an 
event is introduced as the cause of the action, the agent and the 
event that follows the agent's causal activity would instance an 
event-causal relation—i.e., the agent-causal relation would then 
be reducible to an event-causal relation. But O'Connor insists 
that no such antecedent relation precedes the action, thus we are 
stuck with trying to understand a causal relation that resists any 
systematic explanation in intelligible terms. If we say that the 
agent brings about or causes the action, then, if we explicate what 
is meant by "the agent caused an event" in terms devoid of reference 
to causation by an event, we are left with a conceptually arcane 
account of what the relevant relation amounts to. O'Connor 
nowhere seems to adequately address this problem. The upshot is 
that he leaves the causal relation as sui generis, being inexplicable 
and unintelligible. In this respect, he does not advance beyond 
previous attempts at making sense of the agent-causal relation; his 
work on providing an account of event-causation as a model for 
agent-causal relations notwithstanding. 
In chapter five, O'Connor argues for a non-causal theory of 
acting for reasons. Additionally, O'Connor considers the range of 
actions an agent undertakes that we can say are free. His account 
of reasons-explanations relies heavily on the work of Carl Ginet. 
The role of reasons in explaining actions is best regarded as 
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teleological on O'Connor's account. Acting to satisfy an antecedent 
desire D is to act in a manner an agent believed would be conducive 
to fulfilling her desire, the action being initiated by the self-
determining causal activity of the agent. The conative state of 
desiring that D is concurrent with the action, but plays no causal 
role, the action being the intended means of satisfying D. The 
intention is itself a causal consequence of the agent's causal activity. 
Moreover the intention is then the action-triggering event that 
"causally sustained the completion of the action" (p. 86). Note, 
however, that the explanation of the action in terms of a reason 
does not have recourse to the reason qua mental state that causes 
the action. Rather, it is the content of the state that seems relevant 
in O'Connor's account (a fact he does not make explicit). The 
reasons direct action, but they do not cause the action. Similar 
accounts of ac t ing for reasons are defended by s imple 
indeterminists like Hugh McCann and, as mentioned, Carl Ginet. 
While such an account of reasons-explanations may be a 
promising route to go for the agency theorist, it seems the agency 
theorist, such as O'Connor, must explain why the reason-state does 
not have a causal function in the production of action. This problem 
seems especially acute for O'Connor given that, as mentioned 
above, he believes there are instances when an agent's actions are 
not caused by the agent herself, but are the consequence of event-
causal processes. Suffice it to say that the problems he faces with 
the theory of the role of reasons in explaining actions are 
outweighed only by the aforementioned problems with intelligibly 
explaining the nature of the putative causal relation that obtains 
between an agent and her actions. 
Finally, in chapter six, O'Connor develops an emergentist 
account of the active powers he suggests are involved in the 
causation of actions by agents. He writes that, "In calling some 
phenomenon 'emergent,' we intend to express the idea that it 
introduces a qualitatively new, macro-level feature into the world" 
(p. 111). The emergent properties relevant for O'Connor's theory 
of action would be agent-causal properties. Such a property is, "a 
nonstructural, natural property that is exemplified by objects or 
systems that attain the appropriate level and kind of organizational 
complexity and that exerts downward causation" (p. 111). In this 
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case, the relevant object or system would be the agent who can 
exercise causation as a result of the supervenient property on the 
subvening base properties. Needless to say, such a move by 
O 'Connor is creative and compelling and may lend more 
plausibility to the agent-causal theory of action. But this requires 
making a strong enough case for emergentism, a task O'Connor 
takes up, providing a preliminary emergentist account of 
consciousness and of the active power he claims would be the 
relevant causal property that would make causation by a substance 
intelligible. Notice, however, that O'Connor's task is a daunting 
one. Not only must he provide an adequate defense of 
emergentism—a task I believe he has taken significant steps to 
fulfill, but he must still convince his detractor that his theory of 
causation is viable. Furthermore, he must show that agent- and 
event-causation are not so different as to render his theory of 
causation irrelevant for the task of making sense out of the idea of 
nonoccurrent causation. While O'Connor has taken steps towards 
fulfilling these tasks in Persons and Causes, more work needs to 
be done. 
Any criticisms aside, O'Connor's work is by far the best book-
length defense of the agency theory to be published to date. He 
addresses the object ions to the agency theory wi thout 
compromising the central features of such a theory of action. 
Furthermore, he provides incisive analysis of the competing 
incompatibilist theories of free action, as well as providing a strong 
argument for incompatibilism more broadly. He examines the 
logical and metaphysical dimensions of the free will debate with 
clarity, depth, and a healthy dose of humility. In light of these 
features and others, O'Connor's book should be welcomed and 
read by those doing work in the philosophy of action, and it should 
prove to be of interest to those doing work in related areas in the 
philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. 
